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 ABSTRACT 
 
A firm-level input price distortion is integrated into a firm’s market selection decision model. 
We conclude that a firm facing more capital and labor costs, as measured by input price 
wedges at the firm level, is more likely to export and have a higher export intensity. The 
assumption is that the domestic market in China is more competitive for manufacturing 
sectors. Moreover, my model suggests that firm-level input price wedges have less of an effect 
on firms with higher productivity. Empirically, I show that total factor productivity for 
exporting firms is lower than that for firms that only sell domestically. I use two-stage 
Heckman regressions to verify empirically my theoretical model. I also find that the 
distortions have greater impact on non-State-Owned Enterprises, and the results remain 
consistent in export-oriented cities in which firms are heavily subsidized for exports, and in 
sectors who have a relatively high ratio of China to United States prices. 
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The key issue I address is the relationship between a countries’ trade pattern and 
domestic input subsidies/taxes for individual firms. For example, how subsidies for capital and 
labor affect exports? Usually, industry-oriented support policies are taken as a threat to a fair 
international trade environment by governments of importing countries who may retaliate with 
import tariffs. In the past, these policies, for instance, includes Japan’s state reduced-rate loans 
and loan guarantee, which fostered its key industries in 1980s, EU’s subsidy to Airbus, and 
China’s new energy subsidy policy in 2010, which caused an initiation of an investigation 
under section 301 of US trade law. More recently, China’s “made in China 2025” strategy 
which uses government subsidies, mobilize state-owned enterprises, and pursue intellectual 
property acquisition has raised political opposition in many importing countries, especially the 
United States. The main question of this thesis is, however, do distortions in input prices for 
firms, which mainly serves for supporting domestic industries, really encourage export and 
hurt foreign firms? 
Before empirically studying this question, I need to overcome the limitation of input-
specific subsidy data. Such information is not available in a typical firm-level survey. In the 
manufacturing sector, for example, direct subsidies can be observed in China’s industry data, 
but the precise way in which different inputs of production are targeted is unclear. More 
specifically, a firm takes all of the subsidy received, which includes governments’ subsidy 
paid for the loss from operation on policy-related commodities like tap water, vegetables and 
meat, into one accounting subject. Also, subsidies supporting key industries, like those in 
“made in China 2025”, are also recorded in this account subject. 
Furthermore, the observed subsidy may be endogenous to a firm’s export. For example, 
some firms may obtain a tax rebate only after they export. Moreover, some types of implicit 
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subsidies, like low cost credit in the form of loans, are not considered in this accounting 
framework. Hence, researchers may mistakenly take some heavily subsidized firms as non-
subsidized, which may cause a misspecification. Because of the limitation in China’s subsidy 
data, there is no paper systematically study subsidies using firm-level data in China, and 
empirically determine its relation to exports. 
The contribution of my thesis includes the following. First, by using the method of Hsieh 
(2009) in specifying firm level wedges, I apply China’s firm-level data to identify indirectly 
the input subsidies of each firm. Second, in the identification of firm level distortions, I use 
my own estimate of labor and capital shares for each sector in China instead of using sector 
shares of the US (as Hsieh (2009) assumed). Empirically, I find that the lower the input 
subsidy distortions are, the higher will be the likelihood of export. This result runs counter to 
the literature where input subsidies are deemed to lead firms to export more. The mechanism 
for why I come to this conclusion is as follows: since most manufacturing sector is labor-
intensive in China, while at the same time China has an international advantage with lower 
labor costs, prices for manufacturing goods are much lower in China’s domestic market. This 
leads to the fact that for manufacturing sectors in China, the domestic market is more 
competitive than the international market. Moreover, the domestic market in China is more 
fragmented, since local provincial officials enact policies that help local firms to grow, which 
makes other firms from other provinces pay a higher fixed cost to enter the market. Lastly, 
based on the model structure of Melitz (2003), I integrate distortions and trade into one model 
to explain why this counter-intuitive relationship could exist. 
The rest of the paper is arranged as follows: Part II reviews the literatures. Part III 
summarizes some common input distortions in China and their sources. Part IV provides a 
theoretical structure supporting my analysis. Part V explains how I process my data and 
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identification process. Part VI shows the empirical results and further discussions In part VII I 
run several robustness check. Part VIII concludes. 
II. Literature Review 
 
II.1 Estimation of distortion 
 
Many scholars and organizations have tried to estimate distortions based at an aggregate 
level. Anderson (2008) together with the World Bank introduced an indicator named Nominal 
Rate of Assistance (NRA) to measure distortions which does not only capture information on 
various kinds of subsidies but also on import tariffs and quotas in agricultural sectors of 
different countries. Similarly, OECD provide an estimate called Producer Support Estimate 
(PSE), which captures most subsidies based on both input and output in agricultural sectors of 
OECD and several non-OECD countries. The estimated distortions mentioned above, 
however, have their own shortcomings. First, indicators like the PSE are country-sector level 
data, which does not allow distortions among households or firms to be observed. Moreover, 
because of the limitation of observations, these indicators are not appropriate for empirical 
models that require a number of observations for consistent estimates. Survey data that 
captures household behavior and has a many observations helps solve the deficiencies of 
country level data. Nevertheless, the main limitation of survey data is that it is difficult for one 
dataset to capture all forms of distortion.  
To estimate properly firm level input distortions, I follow a method that takes all forms of 
capital and labor input distortions into consideration, and estimate the input distortions for 
each firm. According to Hsieh and Klenow (2009), the distortion is referred to the 
inconformity between firm’s marginal productivity and its marginal cost. Specifically, in their 
paper, the distortion in capital input is defined as the ratio of marginal productivity of capital 
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to its cost of capital, 
MPK
r
. The idea behind this identification is that, under the assumption of 
profit maximization, MPK should be equal to r, and when these two factors are not equal, a 
distortion exists. Following the same logic, I can define the labor input distortion as the ratio 
of the marginal productivity of labor to its wage, 
MPL
w
. One flaw of their research is that in 
their simulations, they take each sector’s labor and capital elasticity in the US as a reference 
for China’s sector labor and capital share. My thesis solves these two shortcomings. First, I 
obtain Total Factor Productivity (TFP) of each firm and factor elasticity of each two-digit 
sector in China. Then, I employ data of firms in the manufacturing sectors in China to identify 
each firm’s labor and capital price distortion. 
 
II.2 Firm’s heterogeneity model 
 
Melitz (2003)’s model incorporates firm-level productivity and its export decision, and 
he points out firms with different productivity can coexist in an industry because at the very 
beginning firms do not observe their productivities, and after firms gain knowledge on their 
productivity, they will choose whether to export or not. However, some assumptions in his 
model may be inapplicable to China’s situation. First, as pointed out by Lu (2010), because of 
a relatively lower wage in China, price of goods in manufacturing sectors which are labor 
intensive should be lower than the price in the international market. Also, in my research, I 
provide evidence on how the fixed cost faced by firms for selling domestically is higher than 
the fixed cost for selling in the international market, which also runs counter to Melitz’s 
assumption.  
When applying the firm’s heterogeneity model into the empirical model, correctly 
estimating the productivity level for each firm is important. Several issues may lead to a 
biased estimation of TFP. For instance, firms are able to observe their productivities, and thus 
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these firms will adjust their inputs of labor and capital based on their individual productivity 
level (Olley and Pakes, 1996). As a result, the residual term is correlated with labor input and 
capital input, leading to endogeneity when estimating TFP.  This is known as a simultaneity 
bias. Another problem is that firms with higher capital stock are more likely to survive in the 
market when facing economic shocks, even when they have relatively low productivity. This 
issue creates an inverse relationship between the residual term and firms’ capital input, which 
is known as selectivity bias. Olley and Pakes (1996) introduced a way of estimating TFP that 
eliminates simultaneity bias and selectivity bias. Besides, Levinsohn and Petrin (2002) use 
intermediate inputs as a proxy variable that overcomes a shortcoming of Olley and Pakes 
(1996)  method in which net investment of a firm should always be positive, and positively 
related to total output as well, while in reality the net investment could be negative. However, 
these two methods have not taken the distortions of input into consideration, which may result 
in a biased estimation of firms’ “real” TFP. In my thesis, I eliminate the distortion terms in 
TFP that are estimated by either Olley and Pakes (1996)  or Levinsohn and Petrin (2002) 
methods, leading to a more accurate estimation of a firm’s TFP. 
 
II.3 Misallocation and international trade 
 
When looking at the relationship between trade and misallocation, most literature focus 
on how trade affects misallocation which refers to that capital and labor are not able to flow 
freely in the market to make firms’ MRPL and MRPK equal to their marginal labor and 
capital cost and realize their maximized profit, because of the existence of distortions in input 
prices. As a result, whether misallocation will be mitigated when a country joins the 
international market remain ambiguous. Behrens & Murata(2012) constructed a general 
equilibrium model of monopolistic competition that includes the effect of promoting 
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competition to study the influence of trade on the efficiency of resource allocation. Holmes 
(2014) develops an index measuring allocative efficiency that depends on the distribution of 
mark-ups, which is similar to the one in Chau and Grosskopf (2003). In his model, trade will 
help increase allocation efficiency by changing costs of goods, and thus increasing the 
welfare.. When it comes to China’s issue, argument exists as well. Bai, Jin and Lu (2018) 
argues that trade liberalization may induce larger misallocation and TFP loss, since firms with 
lower distortions exit the market. 
These papers show that the relationship between misallocation and international trade 
remains ambiguous,but do not point out how misallocation will affect firm’s export, since it is 
hard to find a variable measuring firm level distortion, while in my thesis, I presented a model 
and empirical results to reveal the relationship between firm’s export and distortions a firm 
face.  
 
III. Distortion and trade in China 
 
Having grown rapidly over the past 40 years, the development of China seems to be 
successful. However, such success is out of various kind of “distortions” in the market. The 
distortions in China originate from the strategy of heavy industry priority development, which 
aims at concentrating most capital into industrial sector, and finally leads to a 30-year long 
planned economy. To achieve this aim, Chinese government has created various policies to 
suppress the exchange rate, interest rates, and the price of labor and intermediate inputs in 
order to support capital-intensive industries to develop. To support the living of residents in 
cities, the food price is also suppressed, and people living in rural areas were not allowed to 
migrate to cities, so that farmers were extremely poor. As a result, the needs of workers living 
in cities, who are having a suppressed income, can be satisfied (Lin and Chen, 2016). 
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All these distortions lead to many abnormal phenomena in recent years (Aziz and Cui, 
2007; Lin and Chen, 2016): consumptions to GDP’s ratio keeps decreasing, while the ratios of 
investment and net export to GDP are both increasing; the distribution of national income has 
been shifting from residents to enterprises and governments; the growth of labor remuneration 
falls behind the growth of labor productivity; urbanization lags behind industrialization; 
employment growth is far behind the pace of economic growth. These abnormal phenomena is 
a result of distortions rather than some special preference of residence in China (like they are 
more willing to save more in bank).  
International trade has contributed a lot to China’s development. After the reform in 
1978, China switched its trade policy from a Catch-up Strategy to a comparative advantage 
strategy. Still, however, the distortions exist, and China’s huge amount of exports has so much 
to do with these distortions. On the one hand, the over development of capital-intensive 
industries made the rate of employment growth far behind the pace of economic growth, 
together with suppressed income. Thus, household consumption and the demand of consumers 
on import is constrained by slow growth of income, which results in continuous increase in 
trade surplus. On the other hand, because of the distortions assigned to firms by Chinese 
government, like suppressed labor wage, suppressed exchange rate, subsidies to firms, China’s 
firms do not have to be very productive to survive in the international market.  
 
III.1 Capital distortion 
 
Incomplete financial market contributes a lot in misallocations in capital. Financial 
sectors serve as blood vein of the whole economy, and blood obstruction will slow down the 
pace of economic growth. For example, if firms cannot obtain funding from banks, then they 
cannot operate normally. Finance and risk capitals are key sources which may be needed by 
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firms, and with better financial infrastructure like that in US will help financial resource be 
allocated more efficiently. As a comparison, banking sectors is China are dominated by badly 
managed and slowly progressive public banks which are ineffective in enforcing credits to 
private firms, and the stock market in China is also known for its inefficiency and plenty of 
regulations (Banerjee and Moll, 2009). For instance, short selling is not allowed, and 
derivatives markets are underdeveloped. In fact, the incomplete financial market is a 
phenomenon of financial suppression that exists in many developing countries (McKinnon, 
1973). The form of financial suppression includes both restrictions on deposit and lending 
rates and capital account controls (Bai, 1999). Garnaut (2001) found that the official interest 
rate is lower than market interest rate by at least 50%, and most low-interest loans are assigned 
to State-owned enterprises. Given an official interest rate that is fixed, a cheaper credit will 
lead to a lower capital distortion, since the cheaper credit is representing a lower marginal 
product of capital. 
A second form of capital distortion is soft budget constraint faced by SOEs (Kornai, 
2003). Since local economy development is closely related to local state-owned enterprises, 
which contributes a lot on tax income and creates job position for local residents, local 
governments need to play roles as supporting organizations to make sure SOEs can survive in 
the market, even SOEs with lower productivity. As a result, since SOEs are not constrained by 
their capital inputs, they can apply more capital than they originally need, thus creating a 
much lower MPK. 
 
III.2 Labor distortion 
 
Labor distortion in China mainly comes from the so-called “Hukou” system, which is 
referred to household registration system in China. Each individual has their own Hukou 
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status, and most people’s Hukou status inherited from their parents, even though it is possible 
for them to change the status in the future. Hukou system in today’s China is complicated. 
After its creation in 1958, China began to connect various policies affecting labor market to 
Hukou. The first attribute of Hukou is that each person is registered in a location, while this 
location may not be this person’s real physical location. The second attribute of Hukou is that 
labor still has mobility under the structure of household registration system, so that there are 
many people working in places that do not correspond to their Hukou origin Fields & Song 
(2013) pointed out there are hundreds of millions of migrants in China working in different 
job positions in cities while still remaining their rural, or agricultural Hukou status. There are 
several reasons for the inconformity of individuals’ real physical locations and Hukou 
locations. For example, in some cities only high-skilled and well-educated workers can be 
registered.  
Many papers in the literature suggest that rural Hukou holders are facing labor market 
discrimination when working in cities. The first type of discrimination is wage discrimination, 
in which most studies have investigated. It is defined as workers who have same productivity 
receiving different wages. Lee (2012) showed that local workers with urban Hukou has more 
than 30% hourly wage than rural Hukou holders with China Urban Labor Survey in 2005, and 
28% of the difference cannot be explained by observable variables. Song (2013) used Rural-
Urban Migration survey data in China collected in 2008 and investigated how differently rural 
Hukou holders working in cities are discriminated in SOEs and private firms. He found that 
for workers with same personal characteristics, urban Hukou holders have over 50% more 
income than rural Hukou holders in SOEs, while this percentage number is only 5% in private 
firms. If we assume workers in SOEs and private firms are having a similar marginal product 
of labor, a higher wage paid to the SOEs will lead to a lower 
MPL
w
, which is a lower distortion. 
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Also, in our data we find that SOEs are having a lower MPL, which leads to an even lower 
labor distortion. 
The second type of discrimination is called hiring discrimination, which is defined as 
workers with same level productivity having different access to identical jobs. (Bertrand & 
Mullainathan, 2004). Several literatures support the existence of hiring discrimination based 
on Hukou exist. Zhao and Howden (2010) employed a household survey conducted in Beijing 
in 2006 and found that number of employed people in a household have a significantly 
negative relationship with rural Hukou status. Chen and Hoy (2011) used survey data on 21 
manufacturing companies in Shanghai and found that workers working in urban area while 
with rural Hukou accounts for only a small portion in State-owned enterprises that have higher 
wage level, while in private companies there are a higher share of workers with rural Hukou 
status. Thus, firms hiring more people with city Hukou status, like SOEs, wage, and will have 




Zhao (2005) also demonstrates that rural Hukou holders working in cities have more 
difficulties in accessing to jobs covered by social insurance programs, since private firms are 
only required to pay social insurance only for local residents. Gagnon et al. (2011) found that, 
migrant workers with urban Hukou registered in other provinces are 17% less likely to find 
formal job, and this gap cannot be explained without considering it as a discrimination based 
on Hukou registered location. Thus, hiring more people with Hukou registered in rural area or 
other provinces may help firms have a lower real labor cost that is represented by MPL, and 




From the above analysis, we can see a Hukou status’s effect on labor distortion is 
ambiguous. For example, a city Hukou status can increase not only wage w, but also increase 
the real cost MPL by covering employees with insurance. But it still needs to be admitted 
Hukou system is a main source of labor distortion. 
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Another source for labor distortion is surplus rural labor force. As a country transfer from 
an agricultural to an industrial economy, the demand in labor supply in non-agricultural 
sectors increases greatly, while most people are still remaining in rural areas. When these 
people began to move from rural areas to cities to find job, the industrial sector can expand 
without raising wages, which resulted in an underestimated wage level for workers. Also, 
as Lewis depicts, the turning point is attained when the marginal productivity of labor in the 
traditional sector is equal to that of the modern sector. This finally leads to a lower wage level 
but a high MPL, thus creating the deviation of MPL from wage. There has been a lot of 
arguments on whether China has passed Lewis (1954) point, which refers to the situation 
where all surplus rural labor force has moved to industrial sectors, and wages begin to 
increase. Zhang Xiaobo (2011) used primary surveys of wage rates to show a rising trend of 
real wages in 2003, indicating that there is no more surplus labor in agricultural sectors. 
However, Jane Golley (2011) argued that even though there is a significant rising in wage of 
unskilled workers between 2000 and 2009, such rising has no significant relationship with 
unskilled labor shortage, so that China still has abundant surplus labor force in rural areas. 
Fung Kwan et al. (2018) also argued that official data has over reported agricultural labor 
statistics, so they derived a dataset including labor’s participation in agriculture sectors and 
production cost and revenue. They compared the estimated required labor requirement and 
actual observed labor requirement and concluded that the surplus drops from 18% in 2001 to 
12% in 2013, suggesting that even though China has reduced redundant labor, it still has a 
long way to go before passing Lewis point. As long as some industries are hiring workers with 
a suppressed wage, in a dynamic process MPL will always be greater than wage level. 
A last form of labor distortion can be shown by the facts that SOEs in China have high 
labor redundancy. It is known in China that many jobs in SOEs are referred as the “Iron bowl” 
which means a secure job, and many employees will not be fired, so that many of the 
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employees are not fully devoted to their jobs. Another example is that in many private firms, 
employees are facing a larger burden than those in SOEs. Many employees in private firms 
need to work for more than 10 hours every day, while employees in SOEs only need to work 
for 8 hours which includes their noon rest. With these burdens, it is very likely for private 
firms to create more value added and have a higher MPL, which is verified in the data. In my 
dataset, I also find the wage level for employees in SOEs and private firms are quite similar. 
Given a similar wage, a private firms’ higher marginal product revenue of labor will suggest a 
higher labor distortion. 
The table below summaries different representations of capital and labor distortions. 
Capital distortion MPK r MRK/r 
Lower price of credits ↓ - ↓ 
Soft budget constraint ↓ - ↓ 
Labor distortion MPL w MPL/w 
Surplus rural labor force ↑ ↓ ↑ 
Hukou-fail to cover social insurance ↓ - ↓ 
Hukou-wage discrimination - ↓ ↑ 
“Iron bowl”- A secured job in SOEs ↓ - ↓ 
 
The literature above mainly focuses on distortions based on inputs or production factors, 
while in reality there are many other forms of distortions including different types of 






IV. Theoretical model 
IV.1 Setup 
 
To begin, I follow Lu (2010)’s method, which incorporate Melitz (2003) and Bernard 
(2007)’s model, to build the setup of the model. Assume there are two countries m∈
{US,CN}, that using capital and labor as inputs for production. I use d to represent CN, which 
is the domestic market, or within country trade, and x to represent US, which is the exported 
or importing country. In both countries, s is used to denote sectors, and each sector has a share 
of γs ∈ (0,1), with a Cobb-Douglas Utility function, where i denotes each firm. 
U = ∏(Qs)
γs 












where σ > 1is the elasticity of substitution across goods, and μm(φ) = Tmφ
−z, which 
measures potential firms in country m and sector s with at least productivity φ. Assume z is a 
constant term across countries and sectors, and Tm determines the technology level in country 
m. 
Assume firms in each sector have heterogeneous productivity, φ. Using i to denote each 
firm, the production function for a firm within one sector is yi(𝜑) = φiLi
𝛼𝑠Ki
βs, where 𝛼𝑠 is 













Firm’s price is a markup over variable cost. Selling abroad requires each firm to pay 
transportation cost and tariff t>0. Here I assume the tariff for each firm in each sector is flat. 
The price for within country trade is pid(𝜑) =
σ
σ−1
ci(𝜑), and the price for trading in 
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international market is pix(𝜑) = (1 + t)
σ
σ−1
ci(𝜑), where t includes tariff rate and extra 
transportation cost, subscript d denotes domestic market and subscript x denotes foreign 
markets. 
For simplicity, define ρ =
σ−1
σ



















































where rid(𝜑) and rix(𝜑) defines each firm’s revenue from within country trade and 
international market respectively. γs is the sector share of the whole market. Xx is the total 
expenditure in international market, and Xd is the total expenditure in the market within 
domestic country. 𝑃𝑠𝑑 represents the price index in domestic market for sector s. 𝑃𝑠𝑥 defines 
the price index in foreign market for sector s.  
Assume that 𝑓𝑖𝑑, 𝑓𝑖𝑥, to be the fixed cost that is required to enter the within country 














For simplicity, it is assumed that 𝑓𝑖𝑑 of each firm is identical and can be represented as 
𝑓𝑑. Same for 𝑓𝑖𝑥, which is defined as 𝑓𝑥 below. To stay in the market, a firm needs to have a 
profit that is at least π(φ∗) = 0, so the productivity cutoff for selling domestically and export 
is: 
𝑟𝑖𝑑(𝜑𝑑
∗ ) = 𝜎𝑓𝑑 
𝑟𝑖𝑥(𝜑𝑥
∗) = 𝜎𝑓𝑥 
Using the productivity cutoff equations (2) and formula (1), the relationship between 















In Melitz(2003)’s model, it is assumed that the ratio of price indexes in two countries, 
𝑃𝑑𝑠
𝑃𝑥𝑠
, is equal to one, since two countries are symmetric. As a result, because of the existence of 
tariffs and the transportation cost, the productivity cutoff for exporting, φx
∗ , is greater than the 
one for selling domestically, 𝜑𝑑
∗ . However, when comparing a developed country to a 
developing country, the ratio of price indexes 
𝑃𝑑𝑠
𝑃𝑥𝑠
 can be less than one.  
Also, note that trading within one country includes trading in the firm’s own province in 
which this firm pays a lower fixed cost, as well as trading to other provinces in the same 
country, in which a firm needs to pay a higher fixed cost, due to local protectionism in China. 
The latter can be defined as market fragmentation. In both cases, equation (3) may give us that 
𝜑𝑥
∗ < 𝜑𝑑
∗ , even though I do not assume any difference between price indexes of the two 
countries.   
First, if trading within one country is dominated by trading across the country, selling 
domestically may incur an increase in fixed costs due to market fragmentation between 
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provinces. 𝑓di = 𝑓0 + 𝜆 ∗ 𝑆𝑘, where f0 represents the cost that a firm has to pay in order to sell 
in a local area, and 𝑆𝑘 represents the degree of market segment of one province. Therefore, 𝜆 ∗
𝑆𝑘 represents the extra cost a firm needs to pay if it wants to sell to other provinces. Moreover, 
because of the existence of market segmentation among provinces in China, it is likely 𝑓𝑑 >
𝑓𝑥. Therefore, it is possible the cutoff for selling domestically is greater than the one for 




∗ < 1, where d refers to a developing country and x refers to a developed 
country. On the other hand, if trading within one country is dominated by trading in the local 
province, the domestic market size faced by one firm, 𝑋𝑑, would be very small. In the last 
section of this chapter, I find empirical evidence for these assumptions. 
Figure 1 where φd > 𝜑𝑥 exhibits the pattern discussed above. The x axis exhibits the 
range of firms’ productivity, and the y axis represents firms’ revenue. The Blue line represents 
firms’ revenue from both international market and within country trade, while the red line 
shows the revenue from only the international market. When firm’s productivity is greater 
than φd, it will choose to both export and within country trade, and when its productivity lies 






IV.3 Distortion’s effect 
 
Then I allow input and output distortions in the model. I follow Hsieh’s (2009) method to 
summarize capital input and labor inputs by defining them as, 
Distortions on capital: 
 1 + 𝜏𝐾𝑖𝑡 
Distortions on labor:  
1 + 𝜏𝐿𝑖𝑡 
With the profit function:  
𝜋𝑖𝑡 = 𝑃𝑠𝑌𝑖𝑡 − (1 + 𝜏𝐿𝑖𝑡)𝑤𝐿𝑖𝑡 − (1 + 𝜏𝐾𝑖𝑡)𝑟𝐾𝑖𝑡 
The capital and labor distortions are also named as “wedges” of capital and labor by 
Hsieh (2009). There are many forms of capital and labor distortion. For example, firms with 
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lower capital wedges may have access to lower cost credits or may receive subsidies to 
purchase a large amount of fixed assets. Firms with lower labor wedges may hire people 
without the local household register, or in the form of signing dispatch labor contract, so that 
they do not have to pay these people for their social insurance and house funds (Hertel, 2006). 
Besides, since 2007, China has not yet passed the Lewis point; firms that hire people from 













from which I defined the observed productivity, 𝜑𝑜𝑏𝑠, as a function of firm’s real 




(1 + 𝜏𝐿𝑖𝑡)𝛼𝑠(1 + 𝜏𝐾𝑖𝑡)𝛽𝑠
(4) 
When the distortion terms 1 + 𝜏𝐾𝑖𝑡 and 1 + 𝜏𝐿𝑖𝑡 are greater than 1, the productivity that 
can be observed will be lower than a firm’s potential, or real productivity, which may result in 
firm’s productivity falling below the threshold for within country trade. Figure 2 shows the 
effect of distortions. The dashed vertical line marked with φreal points out where a firm’s 
productivity could originally be, and the dashed line marked with φobs shows the observable 
productivity after distortions. In this case, this firm will only export, and the firm’s revenue 






Nevertheless, based on this model, it can also be found that firms with a higher potential 
productivity are less affected by the distortions. Figure 3 presents firms with a higher potential 
productivity, and it can be seen that for these firms, a lower observed productivity does not 






Another conclusion from this model is that firms in sectors with higher capital and labor 
shares are more likely to be affected by distortions. Equation (4) tells us, given the same level 
of distortions τkit, τLit, and potential productivity φ, the larger the labor and capital elasticities 
are, the lower the value of observed productivity is. Using this result, I can compare the effect 
of distortions on various types of firms. For example, table 1 exhibits the sector share of SOEs 
and private firms, and from table 1, we can observe the estimated capital and labor shares to 
be almost identical for SOEs and private firms. Thus, I assume that the distortions may not 
have significant different effects between SOEs and private firms, and this conclusion should 






  SOEs Private firms 
Capital share 0.186 0.184 
Labor share 0.132 0.143 
Source: Annual Survey of Industrial Firms 
in China 
 
IV.4 Verification of assumptions 
 






, I will have 𝑷𝑪𝑵 < 𝑷𝑼𝑺.  
To begin with, I demonstrate the wage level, interest rate level, and price level of two 
countries at a first glance. I select the 10-year Treasury bond yield rate in China and US as the 
interest level to be compared. From figure 4, I can see that the interest rates of two countries 
does not strictly follow which one is larger. Especially from the period of year 2002 to 2007 
which is covered by my sample data, the gap between two interest rates exhibited a waning 






However, the wage level does vary a lot between these two countries. Table 2 displays 
the annual average wage income per person in the manufacturing sector, and both incomes’ 
units are US dollars. In table 2, the average income level of China in manufacturing sectors is 
far lower than in the US. 
Table 2 
Year China personal income US personal income 
2013 6921 50646 
2014 7874 51610 
2015 8175 52527 
2016 8110 54071 
2017 8795 55295 
Data source: US Bureau of labor statistics; National Bureau of 
statistics of People's Republic of China 
Unit: US dollar 
 
In figure 5, I use the export unit price of 4-digit level products in manufacturing sectors 
to show the probability of a lower price in China. My data sample comes from International 
Trade Center (ITC), and in my final sample, there are 623 4-digit sectors in total. Numerically, 
the probability of China having lower prices in manufacturing sectors is 78.3%. I firstly define 
the unit price ratio of each 4-digit sector as 
𝑃𝐶𝑁
𝑃𝑈𝑆
, then I take the mean of 4-digit level unit price 
ratio into 2-digit sectors. Figure 6 exhibits the average price ratio in 29 2-digit manufacturing 
sectors, from which one can notice that in most sectors the average price ratio is smaller than 
1. Moreover, figure 6 also indicates that sectors with a higher standardized labor share are 
more likely to have a lower price in China.  




           Figure 5                                       
  












In this part, I prove the pattern suggested in above graphs. Following Eaton and Kortum 
(2002)’s model, the price index of each sector can be defined as: 
































   


































where TCN and TUS state technology in two countries, θ > 1 represents the trade elasticity 






 and Γ is the Gamma function. For simplicity, I drop the 













1−𝛼 )−𝜃 + 𝑇𝑈𝑆 (𝑤𝑈𝑆
𝛼 𝑟𝑈𝑆









 which is less than 1 as I have previously assumed, so that 
𝑃𝐶𝑁 − 𝑃𝑈𝑆 ∝ [𝐴𝐾
−𝛼𝜃 − 𝐵][𝑑−𝛼𝜃 − 1] 
 
where A = TCN𝑟𝐶𝑁
−𝜃, B = TUS𝑟𝑈𝑆
−𝜃. Since [𝑑−𝛼𝜃 − 1] < 0, and [𝐴𝐾−𝛼𝜃 − 𝐵] is 
monotonously increasing with α. As a result, if α is large enough, 𝑃𝐶𝑁 − 𝑃𝑈𝑆 is possible to be 
greater than 0, suggesting that PCN < PUS. Moreover, since that 𝑃𝐶𝑁 − 𝑃𝑈𝑆 is decreasing with 
an increasing α, I can also conclude that in sectors that are more labor-intensive, 
PCN
𝑃𝑈𝑆
 is much 





Assumption 2: 𝒇𝒙 < 𝒇𝒅 in China. 
 
In my model, another assumption that determines the inverse relationship between two 
productivity cutoffs is that firms usually face a higher fixed cost when trading within China. 
Poncet (2003) uses data for 1987, 1992 and 1997 and finds that during the period of 1987 to 
1997 inter-provincial trade flow intensity is decreasing while involvement in international 
market is gradually increasing. Poncet (2005) observes a reduction in provincial market 
integration between 1992 and 1997 as well, after calculating the boarder effect of each 
province. How could it be so? Local protectionism of each province is the main source for a 
high fixed cost of within country trade. In the 1980’s decentralization reforms, provincial 
governments are placed with more regulatory responsibility, ownership of firms, and 
economic and financial powers. As a result, to assist local economy, local government uses 
these given powers to implement discriminatory product and heal certification standards, and 
subsidies to local businesses in purchase of locally produced products in order to reduce 
competition with inter-provincial products and to maintain employment and competitiveness 
in local enterprises. (China economic research,1993; World bank,1994; Development research 
center, 2003). Poncet (2005)’s empirical results verify that provinces’ domestic trade 
protection mainly serves for social-economic stability preservation and fiscal revenues 
maximization. The phenomenon of local protection finally leads to a higher cost for a firm that 
wants to sell to another province. 
 
Assumption 3: Trading only in local province results in smaller market size. 
 
I use GDP of each province as a proximity of market size. Table 3 shows the 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝/∑𝐺𝐷𝑃−𝑝 of each province in 2006, where GDPp defines the GDP of province p, and 
∑GDP−p defines the sum the GDP of all other provinces which does not include province p. 
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Table 3 suggests that, for almost each provinces, the relative GDP ratio is less than 5%, and 
for the province that accounts for the largest amount of GDP, the relative GDP ratio is only 
13%.   
Table 3 
Province GDP 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝/∑𝐺𝐷𝑃−𝑝 
Beijing 811.78 4% 
Hebei 1146.76 5% 
Liaoning 930.45 4% 
Shanghai 1057.22 5% 
Jiangsu 2174.21 10% 
Zhejiang 1571.85 7% 
Shandong 2190.02 10% 
Henan 1236.28 6% 
Hubei 761.75 3% 
Hunan 768.87 3% 
Guangdong 2658.78 13% 
Sichuan 869.02 4% 
Chongqing 390.72 2% 
Tianjin 446.27 2% 
Shanxi 487.86 2% 
Inner Mongolia 494.42 2% 
Jilin 427.51 2% 
Heilongjiang 621.18 3% 
Anhui 611.25 3% 
Fujian 758.39 3% 
Jiangxi 482.05 2% 
Guangxi 474.62 2% 
Hainan 106.57 0% 
Guizhou 233.90 1% 
Yunnan 398.81 2% 
Tibet 29.08 0% 
Shaanxi 474.36 2% 
Gansu 227.74 1% 
Qinghai 64.85 0% 
Ningxia 72.59 0% 











a. Data description  
Data used in this paper is Annual Survey of Industrial Firms in China, which is collected 
and published by National Bureau of Statistic in China. The samples in this data are mainly 
derived from the quarterly and annual reports submitted by the sample enterprises to the local 
statistics bureau. The full name of this data is called “Database of all SOE and above-scale 
non-SOE industrial enterprises”, whose sample scope is all state-owned industrial enterprises 
and non-state-owned industrial enterprises above a certain size, and whose statistical unit is an 
enterprise legal person. The industrial firms here includes firms in "extractive industry", 
"manufacturing industry" and "power, gas and water production and supply industry" in the 
"national economic industry classification", which mainly includes manufacturing industry 
(accounting for more than 90%). "Above scale" requires the annual main business income 
(that is, sales) of the enterprise to be 5 million yuan or more, in 2011, the standard was 
changed to 20 million yuan or The database based on the above statistical method has been 
collected since 1998, and the industrial enterprise database used by most scholars is from 1999 
to 2007. 
As the main component of the database is manufacturing enterprises, the statistical 
standard of the database is relatively consistent with the industrial classification of other 
countries, and some variables (such as capital, R&D input and export delivery value) are 
easier to measure. 
The statistical method of the manufacturing industry includes 30 categories (double-digit 
industries), including agricultural and sidelines-food processing industry, food manufacturing 
industry, handicrafts and other manufacturing industries, waste resources and waste materials 
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recycling and processing industry, corresponding to the national economy industry 
classification and code (GB/t4754-2002) code 13 ~ 43(excluding 38). 
In order to maintain the integrity of enterprise samples and to be comparable with 
existing studies, I took all state-owned and non-state-owned industrial enterprises above the 
scale from 1999 to 2007 as the main samples for my analysis of the database. 
From 1999 to 2007, China's industrial enterprise database included more than 2 million 
observations. The number of sample enterprises increased from about 160,000 in 1999 to 
about 330,000 in 2007. In the nine-year sample period, there are about 550,000 enterprises in 
total. Obviously, this is an unbalanced panel data. Due to the closure, restructuring of 
enterprises and other reasons, only over 46,000 enterprises (about 8% of the total number of 
enterprises in the sample) appeared continuously in the whole sample period.  
The database includes two types of information about the enterprise: one is the basic 
information of the enterprise, and the other is the financial information of the enterprise. The 
basic information of an enterprise includes: code of legal person, name of enterprise, legal 
person representative, contact number, postal code, specific address, industry to which it 
belongs, type of registration (ownership), affiliation, year of operation, number of employees 
and other indicators. Enterprise's financial data includes current assets, accounts receivable, 
long-term investments, fixed assets, accumulated depreciation, intangible assets, current 
liabilities and long-term liabilities, paid-in capital, advocate business income, advocate 
business cost, operating expenses, management fees, financial costs, operating profit, total 
profit tax, advertising, research and development fee, the total amount of total wages, welfare 
funds, value-added tax, industrial intermediate input, such as gross value of industrial output 
and export delivery value indicators. The total number of indicators is about 130. 
Table 4 describes the total number of enterprises and the share changes of state-owned, 
collective, private and foreign-funded enterprises (including Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan 
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enterprises) from 1999 to 2007. It can be seen that the proportion of state-owned and 
collective enterprises has been significantly reduced from 2/3 in 1999 to less than 1/10 in 
2007, while the proportion of private enterprises has rapidly increased from less than 30% to 
over 70%. This table reflects the drastic change of structure of Chinese market economy from 
one perspective.  
 
Table 4 
Year State-owned enterprises(%) private firms(%) foreign firms(%) 
1998 62.8 27.18 10.02 
1999 57.53 31.59 10.88 
2000 49.21 39.32 11.47 
2001 35.45 53.03 11.52 
2002 28.59 60.53 10.88 
2003 23.98 64.96 11.06 
2004 16.4 72.21 11.39 
2005 10.9 78.59 10.51 
2006 13.14 67.45 19.41 
2007 10.79 70.18 19.03 
    
 
 
Identification of Misallocations 




Define 𝜏𝑙𝑖𝑡 and 𝜏𝑘𝑖𝑡 are firm-level distortions, the profit maximization problem is: 
max(𝜋𝑖𝑡 = 𝑃𝑌𝑖𝑡 − (1 + 𝜏𝑖𝑡
𝐿 )?̅?𝐿𝑖𝑡 − (1 + 𝜏𝑖𝑡
𝐾) ?̅?𝐾𝑖𝑡)  


























In estimation, I use the yearly average industry wage and interest rate,  ?̅? and  ?̅?, to 
identify the firm-level distortion in order to see the effect of any deviation from average wage 
and interest rate levels. 
 
b. Other key variables: 
 
Export: The dataset summarizes the values of the goods a firm export. For firms that do 
not export, the value of this variable is 0. So, aside from knowing about the amount of goods a 
firm export, I can also determine whether a firm export or not. 
Value added: The value added is not reported in 2001, 2002, and 2004. However, based 
on accounting standards, I can use the following equation to generate added value: 
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒
= 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡 − 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡 + 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑎𝑥 
In year 2004, neither added value nor industrial total output is reported. To generate 
added value, U used another equation:  
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒
= 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 + 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 − 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡
+ 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑎𝑥 
Capital: Original value of fixed assets is the foundation of how I identify firms’ capital 
input. Since under accounting standards, book value but not real value of fixed assets is 
reported each year, the value of fixed assets will be underestimated as year passes by 
(assuming under inflation situation). Thus, it is important to convert the value of fixed assets 
to the real one. Firstly, I assume the book value of fixed assets in the year in which firms 
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appears in the dataset for the first time, as the real value of a firm’s fixed assets. Secondly, I 
deflate the real value of fixed assets to 1998’s baseline. The investment deflator is constructed 
by Brandt and Rawski (2008), and since the value for 2007 is missing, I use fixed asset price 
investment index published by NBS for instead. Lastly, as suggested by Brandt (2012), I 
assume a 9% depreciation rate for firm. Thus, aside from the initial value of fixed assets, the 
one for the following years can be calculated by the following formula:  
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡 = 0.91 × 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡−1 + (𝐹𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 𝐹𝐴𝑖𝑡−1) × 100/𝐵𝑅_𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 
where 𝐹𝐴𝑖𝑡 represents the book value of fixed assets of firm i in year t. It is admitted that 
this method of estimating firms’ real capital level might generate a downward estimation of 
firms’ capital. Since the data set only counted in one firm when this firm reached the required 
revenue level, say, 5 million RMB, so that the first time when a firm appeared in the data set is 
not equal to the year when the firm is set up, so the book value of fixed asset appearing in the 
first year may still differ from its real value. 
Employment: Firms in each year report the number of employees who are included in the 
wage bill. Besides, the total wage that is paid to employees are also reported in a firms’ 
financial statements. 
Interest rate: Interest rate each firm faces is calculated as:  
𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡/(𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡) 
Labor and capital shares: There are multiple ways of estimating labor shares. As 
previously said, there are 29 sectors in the sample. The first method I use is to define labor 
share as α =  
labor income
𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒+𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡+𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛+𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑎𝑥
. The denominator on the 
RHS is the income-based value added. In the second way, the labor share is still below the 
level implied by the national income data. So I blow up the labor share in each sector by 25% 
to match the labor share implied by NBS. The capital share would be 1 − α. The second 
method I use is to use Levinsohn and Pertin (2003)’s method to estimate TFP of each firm, 
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and at the same time, the coefficients for labor and capital can be estimated, which are capital 
and labor shares of each sector. Firms in each sector have the same level of labor and capital 
share, say, 𝛽𝑠 and 𝛼𝑠. In this assumption, I loosen the constraint of constant return to scale. 
Also, I use Olley-Pakes (1996)’s way to estimate firms TFP and sector shares. Table 5 exhibit 
capital and labor shares determined by these methods. It should be noticed that the estimated 
TFP by both OP and LP methods are the observed ones that include the effect on distortions. 




 Method 1 Method 2(LP) Method 3(OP) 
Capital Share    
Mean 0.55 0.18 0.48 
Max 0.88 0.26 0.65 
Min 0.15 0.11 0.33 
Labor Share    
Mean 0.45 0.14 0.42 
Max 0.85 0.23 0.58 
Min 0.12 0.08 0.22 
    
 
 
Firm’s productivity: OP and LP methods are both used to estimate firms TFP. To exclude 
the bias induced by distortion, I use the equation below to estimate the “real” TFP and put it 







Aside from the variables mentioned above, there are also several variables that enter the 
empirical model. (1) Firm’s age. The longer an enterprise exists in the market, the more likely 
it is to accumulate mature marketing experience, advanced production technology and good 
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corporate reputation, etc., thus influencing the export decision of the enterprise (2) Firm’s 
asset-liability ratio. Enterprises have to bear a relatively high sunk cost of export in the 
international market, and long-distance transportation will also reduce the speed of capital 
turnover, so whether they can get adequate financial support in time is one of the factors 
affecting the export decision making of enterprises. (3) Firm’s size represented in log form of 
firm’s total employment. The larger the scale of firm’s size, the lower the average cost of 
production, and the easier it is to export. (4) Outsource degree of a firm, defined as 
intermediate input to value added in log form. According to the new economic geography 
theory, the stronger the degree of industrial concentration where the enterprise is located, the 
more fine level of specialization, the easier it will be for industry division, and the easier it is 
for enterprises to be outsourced and to purchase intermediate inputs from other enterprises, 
thus saving the cost of production and create export competitive advantage. (5) Whether a firm 
is State-owned enterprises. SOEs have received the vast share of subsidies each year, which 
may help them to export more, while on the other hand most SOEs are in capital intensive 
sectors, which may weaken their ability to export. (6) Firm’s total input measured in the log 
form of capital and labor. (7) Firm’s ownership, which includes private firms, foreign firms 
and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
 
Market segment: In short term local government can implement market segment strategy 
to protect local employment and tax income to promote economic growth (Ming Lu, 2009), 
especially when other provinces implement the same strategy, the profit of the local province 
would be harmed. To investigate into market segment among provinces, a province-level 
panel data is necessary. I use the ‘price method’ developed by Parsley and Wei(1996, 2001) to 
identify market segment with relative price indexes of 12 goods. ‘Price method’ is based on 
‘iceberg cost model’ (Samuelson, 1954) which originates from one price law. Because of the 
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existence of transaction cost like transportation cost, value of goods will diminish as iceberg 
melting during trade, so even if there is no arbitrage condition, the price of the same good in 
two regions will not be equal. However, the relative price will fluctuate in a given interval. 
Assume in region i and j the relative price of goods with no arbitrage is c, then only when 
𝑃𝑖(1 − 𝑐) > 𝑃𝑗 or 𝑃𝑗(1 − 𝑐) > 𝑃𝑖will trade between i and j exist. As a result, when there is no 




𝑡  will lie into interval [1-c, 1/(1-c)]. 
Our raw data contains the price indexes of 12 goods in 31 provinces, from year 1995 to 
2015. These indexes measure the sales increases of grains, grease, meat, aquatic product, 
vegetables, fruits, alcohol and tobacco, clothing, medicine, fuels, building materials, hardware, 
and daily necessities. The transaction cost contributes to the price difference, letting the price 




𝑡 ∈ [1-c, 1/(1-c)], where m 
represents the type of goods, t represents the year it is, and i and j represent each province. 
When the market segment decreases, the no arbitrage interval becomes narrower, and I can 




𝑡 ) is, 
the less market segment will be. The raw data I obtain does not have the price difference of 
different goods, but does have the increase in price of each good, so I can identify the price 








































𝑡−1), which might increase the level of variance when actually the negative 
number represents the same idea. Besides, taking logarithms makes the distribution closer to 
normal distribution. 
To measure market segment more precisely, the price difference brought by the 









𝑡−1)|, between 69 pairs of neighboring provinces, and got mean(|∆Qmij
t |), then I 
estimated the equation below: 
|∆Qmij
t | = 𝛼 + 𝛽mean(|∆Qmij
t |) + qmij
t  
in which qmij
t  is the error term, and the error term is the fixed effect interesting to us. 




Finally, to find the market segment degree of each province, I calculate the mean value of 
segmij
𝑡  between two neighboring provinces. For example, to see the level of Shanghai’s 
market segment, the mean value of market segment between Shanghai and Zhejiang and the 
one between Shanghai and Jiangsu can be used. 
 
c. Data cleaning 
 
First, I use the investment deflator constructed by Brandt and Rawski (2008) to deflate 
capital. Since the deflator only lasted to 2006, I use the investment index number published by 
national bureau as the deflator for year 2007 instead. CPI is used to deflate employees’ wages. 
Value added is deflated by using the benchmark output deflator for each two-digit sector built 
by Brandt (2010). Intermediate input is deflated by using the benchmark input deflator for 
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each sector built by Brandt (2010). Industry identification ID of several sectors in China were 
adjusted according to new classification criteria, so I adjusted all industry IDs before and in 
year 2002 to be in concordance with those after 2002. Lastly, I exclude some outliers in the 
dataset. Observations with negative and missing value added, industrial output, net fixed 
assets, gross fixed asset, intermediate input, wage bills are dropped. Besides, a firm should 
have at least 8 employees to maintain a reliable accounting system, so I exclude firms without 
at least 8 employees. According to Brandt (2010), variables used to estimate TFP are all 
deflated to 1998 baseline level.  
 
V.2 Descriptive Analysis 
 
Table 6 summarizes key variables. A simple glance gives us some intuition of China’s 
firm’s performance in manufacturing sector. First, over 26% of firms have engaged in 
exporting activities, and 16% of firms’ revenue are driven by exporting, suggesting that during 
1998-2007, exporting has contributed a lot to China’s development. Second, notice that even 
the average for MPL/w̅ is less than 1, the average for MPL/w is almost close to one, 
suggesting the wage reported by China’s firms are relatively accurate in that average MPL 
does not violate too much away from firms paid wage. The capital distortion is much higher 
than labor distortion, and this maybe the evidence most firms are not able to use the market 
interest rate to achieve loans, even banks are having enough funding support these firms. Also, 
we can see that around 12% of firms in China receive a subsidy from the government, which 
suggests government’s strong interference in the market. Unfortunately, however, I cannot 
detect what kind of subsidy a firm is receiving by only looking at this variable. Finally, notice 
that some firms’ capital input is negative, and this is still possible, since depreciations are also 





Variable Description Observation Mean SD Min Max 
Export selection Export selection 1,463,643 0.26 0.44 0.00 1 
Export intensity Export intensity 1,197,191 0.16 0.33 0.00 1 
MPL/w_bar Labor distortion 1,646,841 0.75 6.01 -9.62 7271 
MPL/w Labor distortion 1,651,466 1.02 11.62 -40.99 10429 
MPK/r_bar Capital distortion 1,584,090 40.49 2831.67 -30275.38 1955113 
MPK/r Capital distortion 1,095,223 191.24 30125.54 -105169.20 29300000 
TFP_real TFP removing distortions 1,449,372 6.51 1.45 -8.69 15 
Age Firm's age 1,661,804 10.41 11.82 0.00 449 
Size Employees 1,663,950 265.87 1004.43 0.00 188151 
Finance Asset/Liability 1,663,111 5.20 221.31 0.00 180000 
Outsource Intermediate inputs/VAD 1,655,897 5.56 141.45 0.00 76216 
Subsidy Receives subsidy 1,663,959 0.12 0.33 0.00 1 
Province export Province export ratio 1,463,640 0.26 0.12 0.00 1 
capital Capital input 1,594,675 28872.79 375077.60 -193843.60 104000000 
labor Labor input 1,663,956 3728.39 28947.79 0.00 17300000 
       
 
A. Distortions by types of firms 
 
Figure 7 and 8 show how labor and capital distortions differ across firms’ types. Both 
figures suggest that the State-owned enterprises enjoy the lowest labor and capital distortion, 
while private firm’s distortions rank the highest, and foreign firm’s distortion level stays in the 
middle. This suggests that state-owned enterprises are likely to produce at a lower MRPK and 
MRPL than private and foreign firms when given the same average interest rate and wage 
level, implying SOEs enjoy potential support on capital and labor inputs. Another possible 
explanation is that, as shown above, SOEs mainly belong to labor-intensive sectors, while 












A simple explanation on why SOEs are having a lower capital cost is that they have 
access to lower cost credit from bank. However, what is the reason behind this? The first 
reason is that SOEs are more able to pay back their loans to banks, since many of them are 
facing soft budget constraints (Kornai, 2003), while many private firms never pay back their 
loans after they get the money (Huang, 2003). As a result, banks are more willing to borrow to 
SOEs but not private companies, and they usually require a higher rate of return when facing 
private companies. Another reason is that, as pointed out by Song (2019), whether a firm can 
receive loans depends on its relationship to the funding entities. Usually, most SOEs are 
having a close relationship to local governments, who have strong influences on local banks’ 
business decisions, and that enable them to receive loans with a cheaper price. 
The question is that, can a private firm receive lower cost credits from banks? Yes, they 
can. Sometimes private firms can employ many workers and help boost local economy, make 
special deals with the government (Song, 2019), thus resulting in a very low cost capital and 
land input. Foxconn is a good example. Or, if a private firm has a close relationship to SOEs, 
they can still get support from SOEs even though they cannot receive loans from banks (Song, 
2019). But most private firms do not satisfy any of these two conditions, so that they have to 
pay a higher price to obtain capital.  
The reason for why SOEs have a lower labor cost is also interesting. One possible 
explanation is that SOEs in China have high labor redundancy. It is known in China that many 
jobs in SOEs are referred as the “Iron bowl” which means a secure job, and many employees 
will not be fired, so that many of the employees are not fully devoted to their jobs. Another 
example is that in many private firms, employees are facing a larger burden than those in 
SOEs. Many employees in private firms need to work for more than 10 hours every day, while 
employees in SOEs only need to work for 8 hours which includes their noon rest. With these 
burdens, it is very likely for private firms to create more value added and have a higher MPL, 
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which is verified in the data. In my dataset, I also find the wage level for employees in SOEs 
and private firms are quite similar. Given a similar wage, a private firms’ higher marginal 
product revenue of labor will suggest a higher labor distortion. 
 
B. Distortions by sectors 
 
In part B, I took the mean value of the log term of capital and labor distortions of each 
two-digit level sector. Figure 9 and 10 sort 29 sectors by their standardized labor share, which 
is equal to 
labor share
labor share+capital share
, from top to bottom in ascending sequence, as well as 
showing the distortion level of each sector. Both figures suggest that in labor intensive sectors, 
capital share and labor share are relatively higher. Figure 11 and 12 exhibit the linear 
relationship between standardized labor share and distortions. Labor distortion shows a strong 
positive relationship to the labor share, supporting the argument that labor-intensive sectors 
are facing a higher labor distortion. Capital distortion also has a positive relationship to 
sector’s labor share, even this relationship is not as strong as the one for labor distortion and 
has a larger variance.  
Similar to part A, this pattern can also be explained by that a larger share of SOEs who 
enjoy more support are in capital-intensive sectors. It should be noticed that no causal 



















C. Distortions by time 
In part C, I show how capital and labor distortion change over time, and it can be seen 




D. Distortion by region 
 
Part D exhibits how capital and labor distortions differ across regions in China. 
Following the classification standard of National Statistic Bureau of China, the nation is 
divided in to 4 parts: Northeast, East, Central and West region, and based on this standard I 
took the mean value of capital and labor distortion in log term for 4 regions. Figure 14 and 15 
suggest that both capital and labor distortions are lowest in the west part of China, while 
highest in the east. The northeast ranks the 2nd lowest and central region of China ranks 3rd.  
Two potential reasons account for a lower level of both capital and labor distortions in 
the West and Northeast. The first reason is similar to the argument above. Since the East area 
is developing faster and have higher incomes than other regions, private firms in the East are 
more prosperous, thus bringing a higher distortion.  
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The second reason is viewed in a national strategic side. Before the 1990s, northeast 
China was an economically developed region as well as an important industrial base in China. 
However, with the deepening of reforms and opening up, the economic development speed of 
northeast China gradually lagged behind that of the eastern coastal region. In view of this, the 
country put forward the revitalization strategy of northeast China and other old industrial 
bases.   
"Western development" is a policy of the central government of the People's Republic of 
China, which aims to "use the remaining economic development capacity of the eastern 
coastal areas to improve the economic and social development level of the western region and 
consolidate national defense". In January 2000, the state council established the leading group 
for the development of the western region. After deliberation and approval by the National 
People's Congress, the western development office of the state council officially began to 
operate in March 2000. The overall policy includes the following major projects: West-to-east 
gas and electricity transmission projects; South-north water diversion project; and The 
Qinghai-Tibet railway. 
As a result, during the period 2000-2007, the central government has provided great 
support and established many beneficial policies to the firms in the Northeast and the West, 
which can potentially be the reason for lower capital and labor distortion in these areas.  
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Figure 14 
 




E. Distortions and export 
 
E.1 Distortions of three types of firms 
 
Figure 16 and 17 show how export probability and export intensity differ across firm 
types. It can be seen that foreign firms are the main force of exporting, with both highest level 
in export probability and export intensity. Private firms have the second largest in export 
probability and export intensity. Thus, the distribution of labor and capital distortion suggested 
in figure 5 and 6 cannot fully explain the export condition of these three types of firms. But 
since foreign firms are of minority in the composition of all the firms in China, if I only focus 
on private firms and SOEs, I can find that private firms are of the highest distortion level as 
well as highest export. 







E.2 Distortions across sectors 
 
Figure 18, 19, 20 and 21 all suggest that capital and labor distortions have a positive 
relationship to both export probability and export intensity. Nevertheless, if I only view these 
graphs, I can only conclude that labor distortion‘s correlations to export probability and 
intensity are weak and has a large variance. However, as suggested in part B, positive 
relationship between distortions and standardized labor shares can help explain why 
distortions have a positive relationship to exports. Figure 22 and 23 tell us that labor-intensive 
sectors are much more likely to export and have a higher export intensity than capital intensive 
sectors in China, while at the same time firms in labor intensive sectors are more likely to face 
higher labor and capital costs. 
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E.3 Distortions across regions 
 
In part E.3, I display the distribution of export intensity, export probability, capital 
distortion and labor distortion across China. Indicators on each map are presented at city level, 
and the blank area suggests missing values. Figure 24 and 25 show that on the east coast, 
firms have higher export probability and export intensity than firms in other regions. Figure 26 
and 27 show that both capital and labor distortion are higher in the east coast area, while they 
are relatively low in the west. In sum, viewing from the spatial perspective, capital and labor 
distortions both show a positive relationship to export probability and export intensity. 
However, the maps suggest the same pattern as shown in figure 14 and 15 that the gap in 


















Moreover, based on average capital and labor distortions of each city, I use a k-means 
clustering method to cluster each city in China to 4 groups in order to see whether there is a 
similar pattern of how the distortions are allocated across regions. In areas with dark red color, 
both capital and labor distortions are lowest, areas in blue color ranks the second lowest, green 
the third lowest, and areas in red are with the highest capital and labor distortions. This 
clustering method, which automatically clusters the observations, presents a similar pattern as 
discussed: cities that receive the lowest labor and capital distortions are located in the west, 





K-means clustering based on capital and labor distortion 
 
Finally, I use a k-means clustering method to cluster all observations into 4 groups, and 
then calculate each group’s weight in each city. Figure 29 shows the weight of the group in 
which labor and capital distortions are at their lowest value. It can be seen the west part of 
China has the largest ratio of firms that lie in the group with the lowest distortion terms. 
Similarly, figure 30 shows the ratio of firms belonging to the group with the highest distortion, 
and the result suggests that in east coast areas, cities may have a larger number of firms which 





Weight of distortions with lowest value 
 
Figure 30 









The aim of this paper is to see how distorted input factors affect firms export behavior. 
Since there are many firms who are not engaged in exporting goods, the selection bias 
(whether to enter the international market) may exist. To avoid such problem, Two-stage 
Heckman method is used in this paper. For the first stage, I use Probit model to estimate the 
model below: 
𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 +  𝜏𝑋𝑖𝑡 +  𝛾𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝑘𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑦𝑖𝑡 +  𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡
+  𝑇𝑤𝑜 𝑑𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡
+ 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 × 𝑇𝑤𝑜 𝑑𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 
In first stage, 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑡 is referred to whether a firm export or not. When it is 0, the firm does 
not export, and otherwise 1. 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 represents how the resource allocation is distorted within a 
firm, 𝑋𝑖𝑡 represents all the firm-level control variables. There are two variables serving as 
outside variables for only first stage: 
① 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑦𝑖𝑡 represents whether a firm has received subsidies this year. It is believed 
that subsidies will be given to firms to change whether it will engage into international 
competition, but not how much they will export. Also, this variable only has significantly 
positive effect in the first stage. 
② 𝛾𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 represents the ratio of number of exporting firms to total number of firms 
in each province, when excluding the firm itself, so it is still a firm-level variable.  
These two instruments maybe endogenous, however, since there is one possibility that in 
east coast provinces, in which the local export ratio is high, firms are more active in exporting 
activities, thus having a higher export intensity. Also, as pointed out by Lu (2018), some firms 
in China are heavily subsidized for exports, and the condition for receiving subsidies is that 
these firms should only export but not sell domestically. In my robustness check, I tried to 
locate and find these firms and dropped these observations, which may make these two 
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instruments more reasonable. Another way to solve these potential biased estimations is to use 
other empirical models, including Tobit and zero-inflated binomial regressions. 
Besides, I use 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑡−1, whether a firm exported last year, as a third outside variable. 
However, it is based on a strong assumption that a firm is more likely to export if it exported 
last year, while the export density is not affected by this outside variable. 
In the second stage, 𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑑𝑠𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 is the logarithmic form of firms’ export intensity. The 
second stage excludes the outside variables, and adds in the Inverse-Miller-Ratio: 
𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑑𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 +  𝜏𝑋𝑖𝑡 +  𝛾𝐼𝑀𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡
+  𝑇𝑤𝑜 𝑑𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡
+ 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 × 𝑇𝑤𝑜 𝑑𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 
 
VI.1 Basic results 
 
a. Capital distortion 
 
Table 7 shows the effect of capital distortion on export selection and export intensity. 
Column (1) and (3) are results for the 1st stage of the two-stage Heckman regression, in which 
export selection is the dependent variable. Column (1) suggests that increasing capital 
distortion makes firms more likely to export, and capital distortion makes firms less likely to 
engage high cost within country trade. Column (3) shows the result of capital distortion’s 
effect on export selection when last year’s export selection serving as the third instrument, and 
in column (3) capital distortion also has a positive relationship to export selection. Column (2) 
and (4) are results for the 2nd stage, where export intensity is the dependent variable. Both 
columns exhibit a positive relationship between capital distortion and export intensity, 
indicating when facing a higher cost, a firms’ production will be sold more in foreign markets. 
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It can also be noticed that TFP are all with negative sign, which matches my expectation that 
domestic market is more competitive. 
The coefficients for whether a firm has received a subsidy in column (1) and (3) are both 
significantly positive, which seems to be contradict my model: if the domestic market is more 
competitive, why do firm choose to not sell in the domestic market when they are receiving 
subsidies? A potential reason is that the  subsidy itself is endogenous to a  firms export status. 
In other words, government will only provide subsidies to firms that are exporting. This also 




















 Table 7 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Export selection ln(exp intensity) Export selection ln(exp intensity) 
          
Capital distortion 0.506*** 0.523*** 0.304*** 0.255*** 
 (0.0321) (0.0710) (0.0299) (0.0405) 
TFP_real -0.265*** -0.368*** -0.154*** -0.225*** 
 (0.0183) (0.0438) (0.0202) (0.0297) 
Market segmentation 0.00335 0.0191 0.0365 0.107 
 (0.00941) (0.0322) (0.0648) (0.0891) 
lnage 0.0570*** -0.0353*** -0.0272*** -0.114*** 
 (0.00604) (0.0121) (0.00622) (0.00989) 
ln(size) 0.0792*** 0.0377 0.0316 -0.00662 
 (0.0287) (0.0293) (0.0200) (0.0305) 
lnfinance 0.0119 0.0514*** -0.00254 0.0446** 
 (0.0189) (0.0166) (0.0136) (0.0177) 
ln(total input) 0.321*** 0.0246 0.204*** -0.167*** 
 (0.0305) (0.0503) (0.0199) (0.0254) 
firm type = SOE -0.273*** -0.454*** -0.151*** -0.298*** 
 (0.0196) (0.0373) (0.0118) (0.0359) 
firm type = foreign 0.783*** 0.549*** 0.388*** 0.169*** 
 (0.0685) (0.105) (0.0321) (0.0466) 
Outsource 0.0911*** 0.0183 0.0664*** -0.0347** 
 (0.0178) (0.0166) (0.0135) (0.0163) 
subsidy or not 0.203***  0.128***  
 (0.0333)  (0.0145)  
province export 3.548***  2.030***  
 (0.0700)  (0.0953)  
IMR  0.669***   
  (0.176)   
One-year lag export selection   2.578***  
   (0.0445)  
IMR2    -0.526*** 
    (0.0518) 
Time FE √ √ √ √ 
Province FE √ √ √ √ 
Sector FE √ √ √ √ 
Time × Sector FE √ √ √ √ 
Constant -5.434*** -2.528*** -4.168*** 1.542*** 
 (0.214) (0.737) (0.220) (0.255) 
     
Observations 1,207,412 267,980 779,728 171,971 
R-squared   0.239   0.272 








b. Labor distortion 
 
Table 8 shows the effect of labor distortion, which is identified by ln (
MPL
w̅
), on export 
selection and export intensity. Column (1) and (3) both show a positive relationship between 
labor distortion and export selection, and in column (2) and (4) labor distortion also has a 
positive effect in export intensity, indicating that labor distortion will push firms to export and 






















 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Export selection ln(exp intensity) Export selection ln(exp intensity) 
          
Labor distortion 0.336*** 0.402*** 0.255*** 0.188*** 
 (0.0488) (0.0545) (0.0414) (0.0574) 
TFP_real -0.144*** -0.266*** -0.111*** -0.171*** 
 (0.0236) (0.0277) (0.0200) (0.0270) 
Market segmentation 0.00759 0.0184 0.0352 0.107 
 (0.0114) (0.0302) (0.0662) (0.0921) 
lnage 0.0438*** -0.0508*** -0.0346*** -0.123*** 
 (0.00667) (0.0110) (0.00660) (0.00944) 
ln(size) 0.582*** 0.622*** 0.370*** 0.266*** 
 (0.0508) (0.0636) (0.0350) (0.0551) 
lnfinance -0.000530 0.0403** -0.0100 0.0400** 
 (0.0190) (0.0161) (0.0138) (0.0172) 
ln(total input) -0.184*** -0.543*** -0.134*** -0.441*** 
 (0.0425) (0.0390) (0.0324) (0.0440) 
firm type = SOE -0.266*** -0.456*** -0.148*** -0.294*** 
 (0.0182) (0.0369) (0.0113) (0.0358) 
firm type = foreign 0.803*** 0.600*** 0.399*** 0.178*** 
 (0.0685) (0.105) (0.0327) (0.0490) 
Outsource 0.110*** 0.0452** 0.0772*** -0.0252 
 (0.0192) (0.0180) (0.0141) (0.0180) 
subsidy or not 0.200***  0.125***  
 (0.0323)  (0.0143)  
province export 3.508***  2.000***  
 (0.0763)  (0.0969)  
IMR  0.742***   
  (0.164)   
One-year lag export selection   2.586***  
   (0.0448)  
IMR2    -0.525*** 
    (0.0515) 
Time FE √ √ √ √ 
Province FE √ √ √ √ 
Sector FE √ √ √ √ 
Time × Sector FE √ √ √ √ 
Constant -2.787*** 0.190 -2.407*** 2.944*** 
 (0.223) (0.499) (0.336) (0.383) 
     
Observations 1,207,412 267,980 779,728 171,971 
R-squared   0.237   0.269 








VI.2 Decomposition of distortions 
 
Instead of looking only at  ln (
𝑀𝑃𝐿
?̅?




), where w is the wage level for each firm. However, since MPL and w both can 
present firm’s cost, the effect of ln (
MPL
w
) will be ambiguous. To control for the effect brought 















, and then add them to my empirical 






 have positive effects on export selection and 
export intensity. Similarly, ln (
𝑀𝑃𝐾
?̅?
) can be decomposed into ln (
𝑟
?̅?




In panel A of table 9, the positive coefficient of ln (
w
?̅?
) infers that when a firm is facing a 
relatively higher cost comparing to the industry level, it is more likely to export, and have a 
higher export intensity. The positive coefficient of ln (
MPL
𝑤
) suggests that when the unobserved 
distortion to a firms’ reported wage, which induce a higher real cost in labor input, increases, 
firms will also tend to export and export with a higher share. Panel B exhibits the results for 




shows that a higher relative interest rate would cause more firms to export, and the positive 
coefficients of ln (
MPK
𝑟
) infers firm’s unobserved discount in interest rate leads to a higher 









Panel A: Labor distortion decomposition 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Export selection ln(exp intensity) Export selection ln(exp intensity) 
ln(MPL/w) 0.511*** 0.854*** 0.327*** 0.545*** 
 (0.0724) (0.0762) (0.0485) (0.0777) 
ln(w/w_bar) 0.797*** 1.070*** 0.493*** 0.571*** 
 (0.0839) (0.0810) (0.0540) (0.0653) 
TFP_real -0.381*** -0.766*** -0.237*** -0.533*** 
 (0.0551) (0.0568) (0.0362) (0.0519) 
Subsidy & Province export √  √  
One-year lag export selection   √  
Observations 1,207,412 267,980 779,776 171,974 
R-squared   0.247   0.277 
Panel B: Capital distortion decomposition 
ln(MPK/r) 0.449*** 0.515*** 0.264*** 0.298*** 
 (0.0361) (0.0507) (0.0245) (0.0321) 
ln(r/r_bar) 0.447*** 0.509*** 0.266*** 0.293*** 
 (0.0386) (0.0502) (0.0256) (0.0335) 
TFP_real -0.315*** -0.515*** -0.177*** -0.363*** 
 (0.0289) (0.0462) (0.0247) (0.0361) 
Subsidy & Province export √  √  
One-year lag export selection   √  
Observations 837,211 183,370 569,303 124,009 
R-squared   0.244   0.277 
All standard errors are clustered at province level. All control variables and fixed effects are included in 
estimation 
 
VI.3 Further discussions 
 
a. TFP’s effect on distortion 
 
In this part, I empirically prove the corollary suggested in my theoretical model. To prove 
that firms with higher TFP are less affected by labor and capital distortions, I take the 
interaction term between labor distortion and capital distortion. Panel A in table 10 shows that 
the interaction term of labor distortion and TFP are all significantly negative through column 
(1) to (4), indicating that the positive effect of labor distortion on export can be mitigated 
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when firms are having higher TFP. Panel B in table 10 exhibits how TFP will affect capital 
distortion’s effect on export selection and export intensity. The interaction terms of capital 
distortion and TFP are also significantly negative, suggesting that firms with higher TFP are 
less affected by capital distortion. The coefficients for labor distortion capital are all 
significantly positive as well, and the signs for the coefficient of TFP remain negative, in both 
Panel A and B, which strengthen my robustness, as well as supporting my theoretical model. 
Another way to verify this conclusion is to divide the sample into 3 groups based on their 
TFP, and it can be imagined that if my theoretical model is true, then in the group firms with 
highest average TFP will be least affected by distortions. However, since it is hard to find the 
exact threshold of TFP for firms to switch from only exporting to selling domestically at the 
same time, which of the rest 2 groups the threshold lies in is something remains unknown, so 
that I cannot foresee the difference between the effect of labor and capital distortions of the 
















 Table 10 
Panel A: Labor distortion × TFP 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Export selection ln(exp intensity) Export selection ln(exp intensity) 
          
Labor distortion 0.525*** 0.911*** 0.354*** 0.577*** 
 (0.0708) (0.0705) (0.0497) (0.0724) 
TFP_real -0.322*** -0.719*** -0.198*** -0.517*** 
 (0.0504) (0.0574) (0.0338) (0.0555) 
Labor distortion × TFP_real -0.00918*** -0.0158*** -0.0101*** -0.00851** 
 (0.00273) (0.00388) (0.00191) (0.00388) 
Fixed Effects √ √ √ √ 
Control Variables √ √ √ √ 
Subsidy & Province export √  √  
One-year lag export selection   √  
     
Observations 1,207,412 267,980 779,776 171,974 
R-squared   0.243   0.274 
Panel B: Capital distortion × TFP 
Labor distortion 0.503*** 0.543*** 0.334*** 0.276*** 
 (0.0429) (0.0734) (0.0320) (0.0433) 
TFP_real -0.260*** -0.430*** -0.139*** -0.310*** 
 (0.0205) (0.0465) (0.0220) (0.0304) 
Capital distortion × TFP_real -0.0161*** -0.0160*** -0.0147*** -0.00491** 
 (0.00306) (0.00286) (0.00254) (0.00240) 
Fixed Effects √ √ √ √ 
Control Variables √ √ √ √ 
Subsidy & Province export √  √  
One-year lag export selection   √  
     
Observations 1,207,412 267,980 779,776 171,974 
R-squared   0.241   0.274 
All standard errors are clustered at province level. All control variables and fixed effects are included in 
estimation 
 
b. SOEs vs non-SOEs 
 
In Table 11 and 12, I use seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) to see the how capital 
and labor distortion perform differently on SOEs and Non-SOEs, in order to verify my 
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corollary. In table 11, column (1) reports the difference of labor distortion's effect on firms' 
export decision between SOE and Non-SOE. Column (2) reports the difference of capital 
distortion's effect on firms' export decision between SOE and Non-SOE. In table 12, column 
(1) reports the difference of labor distortions' effect on export intensity between SOE and 
Non-SOE. Column (2) reports the difference of capital distortions' effect on the export 
intensity between SOE and Non-SOE. Coefficient difference reports the differences of the 
coefficients on factor distortions between SOE and Non-SOE, and empirical p-value reports 
the significant value of the differences.  
Results in table 11 suggest that for both private firms and SOEs, capital and labor 
distortion have a positive effect on firms’ export probability. Also, distortions are having a 
larger effect on Private firms than on SOEs, and the SUR model shows that the difference of 
the coefficient on factor distortions between private firms and SOEs are all significant at 1% 
level. However, table 12 suggests that both capital and labor distortions behave similarly on 
both private firms and SOEs, and even though the coefficients for private firms are larger than 
SOEs, the differences between the coefficients are statistically insignificant, which runs 
counter expectations.  
Why do differences exist of distortions’ effect on export selection, but not on export 
intensity? One explanation is that some SOEs providing daily use products, like tap water and 
electricity that does not export regardless of any level distortion. However, when both SOEs 
and private firms enter the international market, only distortions will have an effect on export 
intensity since those SOEs that never exported are dropped from the sample. Another 
explanation is that SOEs are the main forces of earing foreign exchange, so that some SOEs 
may enjoy a low distortion that is directed by the central government, which may offset the 
positive relationship between export selections. When these subsidized SOEs enter into the 
international market, further subsidies are not necessary. 
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 Table 11 
  Export selection 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES  Private SOEs Private SOEs 
Diffenrence  0.193** 0.188*** 
Emipirical P-value  0.021 0 
Labor distortion  0.395*** 0.202***   
  (0.0913) (0.0446)   
Capital distortion    0.397*** 0.209*** 
    (0.0244) (0.0227) 
TFP_real  -0.256*** -0.0613* -0.289*** -0.0787*** 
  (0.0600) (0.0315) (0.0186) (0.0202) 
Fixed Effects  √ √ √ √ 
Control Variables  √ √ √ √ 
Constant  -2.078*** -4.148*** -4.853*** -5.528*** 
  (0.519) (0.224) (0.251) (0.223) 
      
Observations   1,043,921 1,043,921 1,043,921 1,043,921 
All standard errors are clustered at province level. All control variables and 
fixed effects are included in estimation 
 
 Table 12 
  ln(Export intensity) 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES  Private SOEs Private SOEs 
Diffenrence  0.091 0.036 
Emipirical P-value  0.174 0.621 
Labor distortion  0.653*** 0.562***   
  (0.0723) (0.0758)   
Capital distortion    0.444*** 0.408*** 
    (0.0645) (0.0370) 
TFP_real  -0.583*** -0.498*** -0.466*** -0.402*** 
  (0.0557) (0.0518) (0.0603) (0.0400) 
Fixed Effects  √ √ √ √ 
Control Variables  √ √ √ √ 
Constant  1.665** 0.643** -2.138** -2.644*** 
  (0.683) (0.299) (0.856) (0.254) 
      
Observations   182,142 182,142 182,142 182,142 
All standard errors are clustered at province level. All control variables and 




VII. Robustness check 
 
VII.1 Different TFP and industrial shares 
 
There are different ways of estimating labor and capital shares of industries. In fact, since 
capital and labor price distortions cannot be observed directly, each method of estimating 
factor shares would be biased, as long as I use distorted capital and labor input of each firm as 
estimators. However, I can assume that the direction of the bias is random, since the distortion 
for each firm is uncertain. Thus, if I can use different methods to estimate the factor shares, 
and prove that the empirical results are still consistent, then I can say that the effect of 
distortions in input prices on estimated factors shares is small enough.  
First, instead of using the estimated “real” TFP defined above, I return to TFP estimated 
by the LP method. During this process, the industry shares do not vary, since the “real” TFP 
comes from TFP by the LP method. Panel A in table 13 shows that capital and labor 
distortions still have a positive effect on firms’ export selection and export intensity, and the 
coefficients for TFP are all significantly negative through column (1) to (4). In panel B, I use 
the 1st method discussed in table 5 to estimate the labor and capital distortions, and the results 
remain consistent. In panel C, I use OP method to estimate the new TFP and use it as a control 
variable. Note that when I change the way to estimate TFP, the estimated labor share and 
capital share are changing to the new one as well, thus resulting in changes in labor distortion 
and capital distortion. Panel C shows that effects of capital and labor distortions on export 
selection and export intensity, which remain consistent when the new TFP and factor shares 






 Table 13 
Panel A: TFP_LP 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Export selection ln(exp intensity) Export selection ln(exp intensity) 
          
Labor distortion 0.269*** 0.656***   
 (0.0580) (0.0623)   
Capital distortion   0.318*** 0.428*** 
   (0.0257) (0.0470) 
TFP_LP -0.208*** -0.787*** -0.289*** -0.610*** 
 (0.0236) (0.0277) (0.0288) (0.0453) 
Observations 1,210,031 268,104 1,210,031 268,104 
R-squared   0.244   0.243 
Panel B: Method 1 industry shares 
Labor distortion 0.520*** 0.882***   
 (0.0569) (0.0544)   
Capital distortion   0.0796*** 0.120*** 
   (0.0158) (0.0246) 
TFP_LP -0.448*** -0.991*** -0.0255 -0.268*** 
 (0.0523) (0.0538) (0.0222) (0.0395) 
Observations 1,210,031 268,104 1,210,031 268,104 
R-squared   0.253   0.246 
Panel C: TFP_OP 
Labor distortion 0.0780** 0.240***   
 (0.0364) (0.0539)   
Capital distortion   0.437*** 0.724*** 
   (0.0453) (0.0580) 
TFP_OP -0.00179 -0.336*** -0.409*** -0.914*** 
 (0.0341) (0.0508) (0.0511) (0.0669) 
Observations 1,210,031 268,104 1,210,031 268,104 
R-squared   0.238   0.246 
All standard errors are clustered at province level. All control variables and fixed effects are 
included in estimation 
 
 
VII.2 Export-oriented regions 
 
Is relative competition between domestic and international market in manufacturing 
sectors the only reason explaining the inverse effect of TFP and distortions on export? Bai, Jin 
and Lu (2018) provided another possible explanation. In her research, she found that firms 
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with higher productivity are facing a higher firm-level distortion, and as a result, even the 
productivity cutoff for exporting is higher than the one for selling domestically, firms with 
lower productivity can still export more, because they are sufficiently subsidized. 
It is widely accepted that in China firms are provided with tax rebate if they engaged in 
export behavior. But how do I identify those firms that are fully subsidized and how do I 
identify the regions in which firms’ export activities are most intervened by local government? 
In my estimation, even though I cannot observe the tax rebate rate, I can still assume that firms 
only export and located in regions in which most firms export are mostly likely to receive a 
tax rebate. 
Green bars in figure 31 represent each city’s density of the percentage of the firms that 
export, while white bars represent average export intensity of each city. I choose cities with 
export ratios over 30% and with over 70% of average export intensity as the cities that are 
export oriented. Figure 32 shows where these cities are located in. Most cities belong to south-
east coast area, while two of them are in the mid-west area, and the one that lies in the upper-
right corner borders upon Russia, and do have a lot of trade volume with Russia.  
In figure 33, I strengthen my restrictions and select cities in which more than 40% of 
firms choose to export, and the location of these cities are shown in figure 34.  
To begin, I drop all observations whose location cannot be identified so that based on 
these selected cities, I ran the following regression. Panel A in table 14 shows the regression 
results in which firms with over 90% export intensity that are located in these selected cities 
are removed. Panel B shows the results where all observations in selected cities are removed. 
Panel C exhibits the result in which only observations in selected cities are considered. Lastly, 
panel D exhibits the results with observations in the cities that are more strictly selected. 
After removing the observations in the selected city, both panel A and panel B give 
consistent results: both capital and labor distortions have positive effect on export selection 
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and export intensity. When looking at firms located in export-oriented cities, results shown in 
panel C and D are also consistent. 
As discussed in the last part of chapter 3, trading across provinces is more likely to 
happen in non-export regions, since most firms’ products are selling to the domestic market, 
and local cities or provinces are not large enough to absorb all firms’ products. When 
observations that are potentially heavily subsidized for export are removed and the results 







































Labor distortion 0.245*** 0.683***   
 (0.0708) (0.0682)   
Capital distortion   0.282*** 0.458*** 
   (0.0303) (0.0400) 
TFP_real -0.171*** -0.809*** -0.235*** -0.632*** 
 (0.0665) (0.0668) (0.0299) (0.0460) 
Observations 1,148,614 232,843 1,148,614 232,843 
Panel B 
Labor distortion 0.125*** 0.577***   
 (0.0447) (0.0733)   
Capital distortion   0.315*** 0.419*** 
   (0.0387) (0.0479) 
TFP_real -0.0416 -0.720*** -0.261*** -0.604*** 
 (0.0444) (0.0723) (0.0403) (0.0550) 
Observations 875,237 209,767 875,237 209,767 
Panel C 
Labor distortion 0.507*** 0.553***   
 (0.0686) (0.117)   
Capital distortion   0.388*** 0.247** 
   (0.0396) (0.0585) 
TFP_real -0.541*** -0.671*** -0.475*** -0.412** 
 (0.0964) (0.125) (0.0729) (0.101) 
Observations 232,747 58,337 232,747 58,337 
Panel D 
Labor distortion 0.542*** 0.580**   
 (0.113) (0.128)   
Capital distortion   0.388*** 0.256** 
   (0.0578) (0.0490) 
TFP_real -0.550*** -0.710** -0.448*** -0.435** 
 (0.142) (0.129) (0.0921) (0.0884) 
Observations 142,344 46,738 142,344 46,738 
All standard errors are clustered at province level. All control variables and fixed effects 







VII.3 Sectors with high price index 
 
As I have discussed, a relatively low price in China and a more fragment domestic 
market contributes to a more competitive domestic market. But between two of these 
explanations, what is the main driver? In this section, I check whether my results are still 
consistent when the relative China to US price is close to 1. Table 15 exhibits the relative 
export price of each 2-digit sector. 
Table 15 
Sector name PCN/𝑃𝑈𝑆 
Tobacco 1.02 
Ferrous metal smelting and rolling processing  0.98 
Chemical raw materials and chemical products  0.93 
Plastic products  0.87 
Beverage  0.80 
Textile  0.80 
Leather, fur, feather  0.80 
Non-metallic mineral products  0.76 
Food  0.75 
Chemical fiber  0.72 
Agricultural and sideline food processing  0.68 
Paper and paper products 0.68 
Rubber products  0.68 
Furniture  0.66 
Culture and education sporting goods 0.66 
Non-ferrous metal smelting and rolling processing  0.60 
Pharmaceutical  0.54 
Copying of the printing and recording media 0.42 
Wood processing 0.37 
  
 
Panel A in table 16 presents the robustness check in which I only select sectors with 
relative prices that are greater than 0.85 as my sample. If we take the tariff and transportation 
costs into consideration, given a relative price that is over 0.85 when assuming there is no 
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other influence, trading within one country should be as competitive as trading in international 
market, and the distortion terms should have no significant effect on both export selection and 
export intensity. The empirical results for both labor distortion and capital distortion are 
consistent, and the coefficients for TFP are still significantly negative. This suggests there may 
be other factors playing a role, and as I have discussed above, it might come from a more 
fragmented domestic market in China.  
Nevertheless, Panel B exhibits the empirical results for samples with relative prices that 
are greater than 0.95, in which labor distortions do not have significantly positive relationship 
to export selection and export intensity. Considering of the existence of transportation cost and 
tariffs between two countries, it is likely that trade within country being more competitive no 
longer holds when the prices of the same good in two countries are close to each other. This 
also suggests that when it comes to the assumption that trading within China is more 
competitive than trading in international market for manufacturing sectors, a relatively 















Table 16  
Panel A: relative price > 0.85 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Export selection ln(exp intensity) Export selection ln(exp intensity) 
          
Labor distortion 0.387*** 0.908***   
 (0.117) (0.118)   
Capital distortion   0.426*** 0.703*** 
   (0.0371) (0.0536) 
TFP_real -0.258*** -0.826*** -0.313*** -0.717*** 
 (0.0919) (0.0865) (0.0371) (0.0479) 
Observations 180,263 30,571 180,263 30,571 
R-squared   0.221   0.222 
Panel B: relative price > 0.95 
Labor distortion 0.142 0.135   
 (0.108) (0.129)   
Capital distortion   0.212*** 0.269** 
   (0.0742) (0.105) 
TFP_real -0.0574 -0.302*** -0.120 -0.415*** 
 (0.0814) (0.102) (0.0768) (0.0932) 
Observations 31,576 2,609 31,576 2,609 
R-squared   0.342   0.342 
All standard errors are clustered at province level. All control variables and fixed effects are 





In this thesis, I present how input distortions affect a firm’s export decision, and that 
Melitz’s production cutoffs may not be valid for the case of China. By integrating a firms’ 
productivity with capital and labor price distortions, I show that an input subsidy, or input 
distortion, aimed at supporting a firm’s development, may lead firms  to less likely export, 
even when they are paying a lower cost for inputs. A reason behind this counter-intuitive 
result is that in China’s manufacturing sector, the domestic market is more competitive than 
the international market. There may be two reason for this. First, since most China’s 
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manufacturing sectors are labor-intensive, and the wage level in China is relatively low, it can 
be derived that the price for manufacturing goods sold in China are lower than the price in 
China’s trade partners. To survive in China’s market, firms need to be more competitive to 
lower their cost in order to match the lower price. Second, local protectionism prevails in 
China, thus resulting in firms being less likely to sell from one province to another if they are 
not competitive enough. In order to gain a larger market share, they will turn their eyes to the 
international market, and this also leads to firms with a lower productivity to sell abroad. 
Empirically, the positive relationship between input distortions, which are measured by the 
unobservable firm’s extra cost, proves my model plausible. The negative relationship between 
a firm’s TFP and their export decision also suggests the domestic market is more competitive. 
In addition, I showed that input subsidies, which refer to a low input distortion, are 
focused on State-owned enterprises, capital-intensive sectors, and the west in China. None of 
these attributes represents the main force of exporting in China. Therefore, I conclude that 
input subsidies to firms do not promote exports and that these subsidies are not export 
subsidies.  
However, input price distortions and local protectionism in Chinain the long run hurts 
China’s aggregate TFP, and this China’s growth pattern cannot be sustained. This implies both 
input distortions and local protectionism should be eliminated at the same time. With an 
increasing worker’s wage, development of technology, capital deepening, and a more 
integrated domestic market, domestic market will no longer be more competitive, and when 
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